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A FEW WORDS ABOUT WOMEN IN THE DISCOURSE OF
CRIMINAL LAW UPON READING MARTHA GRACE
DUNCAN’S ESSAY, BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT
Nancy Cook∗
INTRODUCTION
One key idea in Martha Grace Duncan’s essay, Beauty in the Dark of
Night: The Pleasures of Form in Criminal Law, is that in our justice system,
“criminal law represents the juncture where state and individual interact in the
most dramatic way; the point at which the state goes furthest in exerting its
authority over the citizen.”1 This intersecting place or moment “inextricabl[y]
link[s] . . . authority and violence.”2 Professor Duncan follows this
observation with another: the potent connectivity of authority and violence in
the criminal law context offers a striking, almost eerie, contrast to the language
that is often used by courts in analyzing, from a legal perspective, the thorny
conflicts arising from state–citizen interactions related to crime and
punishment.
The harsh realities of crime, victimization, trial, and
imprisonment—all laden with pain and violence—are discussed in opinions
laced with antiquated poetic language, beautiful imagery, and soft sounds.3
Professor Duncan herself constructs similarly unlikely literary pairings in her
writing about criminal law texts, interweaving the languages of story and
witness into the academic discourse of a law journal essay.4
Part I of my response to Professor Duncan’s essay will underscore a few
points Professor Duncan makes about how the beauty of the language of
criminal law is manifested in case law. To illustrate this concept, I rely on
Professor Duncan’s examples of cases involving depraved heart, heat of
passion, attempt, and the castle doctrine are used to illustrate. I also explore
one implicit question in Professor Duncan’s essay: Why has this antiquated
language been preserved? I offer three answers, drawing from examples
∗ Vaughan G. Papke Professor of Clinical Law and Director of the Lawyering Program at University of
Minnesota Law School.
1 Martha Grace Duncan, Beauty in the Dark of Night: The Pleasures of Form in Criminal Law, 59
EMORY L.J. 1203, 1244 (2010).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., id. at 1226–27.
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provided by Professor Duncan’s essay. In brief, Part I identifies the primary
reasons suggested by Professor Duncan: an intentional evasion of precise
definition, exploitation of the evocative power of language to promote a
particular understanding, and renewal of precedent by making indirect
associational links to familiar history.
Part II raises a different question: Why should it matter now, to practicing
lawyers, that criminal law is steeped in outdated, quixotic language? To
answer this question, I have chosen to look at a particular context generally
alluded to, but not directly addressed in, Professor Duncan’s essay.
Specifically, my goal is to discover what implications the peculiar language of
criminal law has for women who find themselves enmeshed in the criminal
justice system, whether as defendants, convicted inmates, or crime victims.
Here, I focus on the “inextricable link to authority and violence”5 present in the
criminal justice system and on the contrast between the hardness of gory,
grizzly details and the softness of imagery used to describe the crimes.
Referencing the three previously noted methodologies (evasion of precise
definition, exploitation of evocative power, and use of associational links to
history), I discuss how the language of criminal law has special application to
situations involving women in the system. Again, the concepts highlighted
here are depraved heart murder, the heat of passion defense, attempt, and selfdefense.
Finally, Part III attempts to demonstrate, through poetic form, just how
pervasive and compelling the literary language of the criminal law is. Using
excerpts from various texts, such as court opinions, news reports, academic
texts (including Professor Duncan’s essay), true-crime stories, personal
narratives, confessions, and testimony, I present a documentary collage
intended to break down artificial constructs of knowledge and provide
evidence of the extent to which our assumptions about crime and women in the
criminal justice system are subject to the power of language detailed in
Professor Duncan’s essay.

5

Id. at 1244.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOW AND WHY
A. How the Antiquated Language of Criminal Law Is Preserved
In her essay, Professor Duncan examines the tendency of courts to preserve
antiquated—and often romantically resonant—language in the criminal law
context. This responsive essay focuses on particular manifestations of this
tendency identified by Professor Duncan: language relating to murder,
specifically references to depraved heart and heat of passion; terms used in
discussions of attempt crimes, particularly those relating to time and place; and
the lexicon of self-defense, with its connection to history and culture.
1. Depraved Heart
Professor Duncan takes us through several epistemological levels in her
discussion of murder. She begins by demonstrating how criminal law uses the
metaphors of body and heart to elucidate concepts of mens rea.6 Courts have
repeatedly described a perpetrator’s state of mind as a state of heart: The guilty
murderer suffers from “hardness of heart,”7 a “depraved heart,” an “abandoned
and malignant heart,”8 and a heart “fatally bent on mischief.”9 The evil heart is
the source of the criminal’s “wickedness.”10
2. Heat of Passion
The heart is understood to be a source of heat, as well as of emotion, and
from the heart metaphor comes the language of fire. As Professor Duncan
notes, the case law is replete with such language, beginning with the primary
idiom heat of passion, which serves as shorthand for a particular kind of loss of
control and justifies the reduction of murder to manslaughter.11 The fire
metaphor embedded in the expression heat of passion has been extended to
cover other aspects of murder defenses discussed in case law. Courts speak of
the parties’ emotions “cooling off” or “rekindling.”12 As Professor Duncan
6

See id. at 1205.
People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 618 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosta, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v.
McLaughlin, 142 A. 213, 215 (Pa. 1928). For Professor Duncan’s discussion of depraved heart murder and
these cases in particular, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206.
8 JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 384 (2004).
9 Id. (quoting Mays v. People, 806 Ill. 306 (1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 McLaughlin, 142 A. at 215.
11 See Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206.
12 Id.
7
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also points out, the event that is generally relied on to justify a heat of passion
defense is one spouse’s discovery of the other in flagrante delicto—literally,
“in the blaze of transgression.”13
As the heat of passion defense evolved, courts and legislatures sometimes
broadened its reach beyond the adulterous spouse situation. In some
jurisdictions, therefore, the operative term is “extreme emotional
disturbance.”14 While this term lacks a direct connection to the fire metaphor,
the defense retains the correlative language through a large body of
jurisprudence. Cases that discuss extreme emotional disturbance15 abound
with terms like “simmering,”16 “inflamed,”17 “hot blood[ed],”18
“smouldering,”19 and “ignited.”20
3. Locus Poenitentiae
When looking at the law of attempt, Professor Duncan highlights court
opinions that emphasize notions of mercy and the potential for redemption.21
As she observes, courts have long voiced the belief that crime is constituted by
both mens rea and actus reus; until the moment of action, the mind can be
dissuaded from criminality.22 In Latin—the Christian language of guilt and
salvation—between temptation and sin lies locus poenitentiae, the place of
repentance.23 In recognition of this principle, Professor Duncan notes a
Missouri case stating that “the law in its beneficence extends the hand of
forgiveness.”24

13 Id. at text accompanying note 74 (quoting JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 32
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206.
15 State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1999); Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1288 (Del. 1978);
People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976). For Professor Duncan’s discussion of these and other
cases that discuss extreme emotional disturbance, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206 n.15.
16 Kaddah, 736 A.2d at 911.
17 McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ky. 2006).
18 Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 908.
19 People v. Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460, 466 (App. Div. 1984).
20 Id.
21 See Duncan, supra note 1, at 1221–22.
22 Id.
23 King v. Barker, 43 N.Z.L.R. 865, 873 (1924).
24 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1222 (quoting State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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4. The Castle Doctrine
One final subject covered by Professor Duncan merits attention: the domain
of self-defense. In her examination of the language of criminal law, Professor
Duncan demonstrates the connectivity of the case law language to AngloAmerican history and, in particular, to our feudal past.25 Building from the
precept that necessity is the “soul of . . . self defense,”26 courts have devised
the castle doctrine, implicitly concluding that one’s home is inextricably linked
to one’s self. Defense of home is defense of self; retreat from one’s home is no
more expected than retreat from one’s very self. “[W]hither shall he flee?”
asked one court in 1884.27 Although “retreat to the wall”28 may be demanded
in a public space, a “true man” is entitled to stand and fight when he (or his
home) is threatened.29 “Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not
sanctuary, is in the home.”30 Home, moreover, is a private domain, the
equivalent of a castle, where the owner is subject to no other.
B. Why the Antiquated Language of Criminal Law Is Preserved
Having clearly demonstrated that criminal law has preserved a language
steeped in history, Professor Duncan explains some of the reasons why. She
elaborates on three rationales that bear on matters discussed in Part II of this
response. They are intentional evasion of precise definition, exploitation of the
evocative power of language to promote a particular understanding, and
renewal of precedent through indirect associational links to familiar history.
1. Intentional Evasion of Definition
Professor Duncan points out that a number of key elements in criminal law
are not clearly defined. The words malice aforethought, for example, do not
mean what they appear to mean.31 Legal experts and courts acknowledge the
ambiguity.32 In fact, the concept has been described as “inscrutable on its
25

Id. at 1232–33 nn.182–86 and accompanying text.
United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27 Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884).
28 MARTIN R. GARDNER & RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 1070 (4th ed. 2004). For
Professor Duncan’s discussion of self-defense, the duty to retreat, and the castle doctrine, see Duncan, supra
note 1, 1230.
29 Erwin v. Ohio, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876).
30 New York v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914). For Professor Duncan’s discussion of this
quote, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1234.
31 See Duncan, supra note 1, at 1207 n.20.
32 Id.
26
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face”33 and “a term of art, if not a term of deception.”34 Similarly, the
premeditation–deliberation formula, which distinguishes first- and seconddegree intentional murder, has been criticized as a “mystifying cloud[] of
words,”35 “notoriously unhelpful,”36 and a “‘collection of colorful verbiage,’
that ‘tend[s] to carry more flavor than meaning.’”37 The ambiguity is arguably
deliberate and strategic.38 It is also, arguably, reflective of the complexity of
the subject matter.
Many in the field disdain criminal law’s figurative language, with its
inevitable ambiguity.39 The American Law Institute (ALI), for example,
clamors for more precision in a climate demanding public exactitude.40 But
Professor Duncan defends the aging language, applauding its breadth and
expressiveness.41 The language, she says, is self-transcendent, “vibrant with
contradiction.”42 In contrast to what she denotes as the ALI’s call for “stenolanguage,”43 Professor Duncan advocates caution and reminds us of the
benefits of flexibility in this difficult area of law.44
2. Evocative Power
A second reason the language has been preserved is its evocative power, of
which, almost certainly, judges are well aware. As Professor Duncan notes, in
the “area of yearning,” beauty is objective and subjective.45 Beautiful
language uses this evocative power to transport readers to another place or
33 Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 43 (2000).
34 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1978).
35 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN DO FOR LAW 27 (1930). For Professor Duncan’s
discussion of the premeditation–deliberation formula, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1236.
36 Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and Judicial
Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 313 (1999).
37 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1237 (quoting CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 362 (Kate E.
Bloch & Kevin C. McMunigal eds., 2005) and CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 441 (Sanford H. Kadish &
Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 7th ed. 2001)).
38 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1237.
39 Id. at 1237.
40 See id. at 1237.
41 See id. at 1237–38.
42 Id. at 1238.
43 Id. 1238 n.231 (“Steno-language refers to utterances that have a ‘fixed set of associations,’ the same in
every context.” (quoting PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, THE BURNING FOUNTAIN: A STUDY IN THE LANGUAGE OF
SYMBOLISM 50 (rev. ed. 1968) (emphasis added))).
44 See id. at 1238.
45 Id. at 1226 (quoting GEORGE HAGMAN, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 97 (2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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time. In the imagery of the language of the criminal law, Professor Duncan
sees “fullness of expression,”46 an organic and interactive system of
communication. According to Professor Duncan, the particular evocative
power of criminal law’s language reflects the ethos of the Romantic
movement, as opposed to that of the Enlightenment when language tended
toward the concrete and literal as an affectation of scientific thinking.47
By opting for the evocative power of language over the persuasive logic of
scientific analysis, some criminal law courts have been able to retain their
discretionary power. Professor Duncan provides several examples of judges
whose opinions illustrate this point: Justices Jackson and Fortas and Judge
Cardozo all exploited the evocative power of language. Using the example of
Morisette v. United States, Professor Duncan shows how Justice Jackson
manipulates language through contrast,48 alliteration,49 and romantic motifs.50
Professor Duncan also highlights how Justice Fortas’s opinion in In re Gault51
employs images of England’s feudal past—the medieval serf and lord—as a
metaphor for the twentieth century relationship between citizen and state52 and
uses the romantic imagery of nature to discuss the due process rights of
juveniles.53 Judge Cardozo also relies on the power of subliminal Romantic
motifs, as evidenced in People v. Tomlins.54
3. Associational Links
One final rationale Professor Duncan posits for preserving language is the
ability of courts to incorporate large swaths of history through association or
allusion. A reference that brings to mind, whether consciously or not, deepseated lessons learned or beliefs imparted makes the task of renewing
precedent relatively easy. An example of this provided by Professor Duncan is
the term malice aforethought, which is described as “fraught with

46

Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1238.
48 See id. at 1212.
49 See id. at 1212–13.
50 See id. at 1213.
51 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1220.
53 Id. at nn.86–87 and accompanying text.
54 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914). For Professor Duncan’s discussion of Tomlins, see Duncan, supra
note 1, at 1233.
47

COOK GALLEYSFINAL

1252

9/10/2010 10:30 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

background”55 or “laden with accreted meaning.”56 This phrase, she says, is a
“language event,”57 meaning the very term carries history with it.58 While
Professor Duncan examines specific feudal associations of castles and the
monarchy,59 she also develops the idea of imagery associated with historical
periods, light and darkness, time and mortality.60 This imagery has
considerable impact on criminal law as it relates to women today.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
This Part address the implications of Professor Duncan’s exploration of the
peculiar language of criminal law for women who find themselves enmeshed
in the criminal justice system. This is a theme generally alluded to, but not
directly addressed in, Professor Duncan’s essay. I posit that whether they are
involved in the system as defendants, convicted inmates, or crime victims,
women are decisively affected by the language patterns described by Professor
Duncan.
In looking at how the old and beautiful language of the criminal law applies
specifically to women, it is useful to return to Professor Duncan’s premise that
criminal law is the “juncture where the state and the individual interact in the
most dramatic way”;61 where, in fact, the state’s authority over its citizens is
most keenly felt. At this juncture, authority and violence are conjoined.62
Ironically, it is here that courts are prone to invoke Romantic imagery or misty
language, defining essential elements of crime and the state’s role in
administering justice in terms that are both evocative and ambiguous. The
characteristics of language that Professor Duncan observes in criminal law
cases are pervasive throughout criminal justice discourse as it relates to
women, and that discourse takes place in court opinions, academic texts, news
reports, testimony, and everyday storytelling. In this exploration of the
language of criminal law as applied to women throughout history, I have
55 ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE 12 (Willard
R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1953) (1946). For Professor Duncan’s discussion of malice
aforethought, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1208.
56 Id.
57 NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT CODE: THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE 60 (1982).
58 For Professor Duncan’s discussion of malice aforethought as a language event, see Duncan, supra note
1, at 1208.
59 See id. at 1229–34.
60 Id. at 1238–43.
61 Id. at 1243.
62 Id.
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chosen to rely on a small but varied selection of texts. My choice of texts is
not random, nor is it the result of a lengthy and involved search. From a vast
array of documentary materials, I have selected what I believe to be a
representative group: news reports of lawsuits against the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC), oral histories of women living and
working inside the prison system, academic texts about women and crime,
true-crime stories, and court opinions, including many cases cited in Professor
Duncan’s essay. Specific applications are particularly noted in reference to
depraved heart murder, heat of passion, attempt, and the castle doctrine.
A. Historical Perspectives and Literary Manifestations
1. Depraved Heart: Body
A brief look at how the language of “abandoned and malignant heart”63—
and more generally the metaphors of mind, body, and heart—has historically
been integrated into the criminal justice system sheds light on that system’s
treatment of women. The era known as the Enlightenment was characterized
culturally by society’s belief in the power and importance of reason. “The
eighteenth century,” it has been noted, “witnessed in general a certain
‘euphoria about the possibility of systemisation and rationalisation.’”64 During
this time, therefore, vice came to be regarded as conduct outside this dominant,
presumptively male norm; if man is basically a rational being, the only
explanation for irrational conduct, such as murder, must be that it occurs
outside the realm of the rational. Accordingly, it was said, “[n]othing is more
certainly true than that all Vice is unnatural and contrary to the nature of
Man.”65 It has also been noted that “[w]ithin the Enlightenment world view,
[serious crime] was caused by some combination of environmental influence,
motive, and uncontrolled passion.”66 Language of this period, in opposition to

63

KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 384.
SUSAN CHAPLIN, LAW, SENSIBILITY AND THE SUBLIME IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WOMEN’S FICTION:
SPEAKING OF DREAD 31 (2004) (quoting SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN’S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN
ENGLAND 1660–1883, at 15 (1990)).
65 KAREN HALTTUNEN, MURDER MOST FOUL: THE KILLER AND THE AMERICAN GOTHIC IMAGINATION 47
(1998) (quoting Benjamin Whichcote, The Glorious Evidence and Power of Divine Truth, in THE CAMBRIDGE
PLATONISTS: BEING SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE, JOHN SMITH, AND
NATHANAEL CULVERWEL 1, 25 (Ernest Trafford Campagnac ed., 1901)). In this era, the word “Man” referred
explicitly to males.
66 Id. at 45–46.
64
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the much-lauded ideal of scientific detachment, reflects the notion that felons
must be “cold-blooded” and “insensib[le].”67
Physiological metaphors were commonly used to aid comprehension. “A
depraved and vicious Mind is as really the Sickness and Deformity thereof, as
any foul and loathsome Disease is to the Body,” proclaimed seventeenthcentury Cambridge Provost and Platonist founder Benjamin Whichcote.68 By
the mid-eighteenth century, the term “cold-blooded killer” had become a
mainstay of American murder reports.69 Similar phrases proliferated; for
example, three “hard-hearted” men were said to have been hired by a woman
to kill her husband in “cool blood.”70 Accounts of the cases of other accused
murderers reported that the crimes were committed “out of ‘a cool deliberate
wickedness of thought,’71 or with a ‘heart obdurate to all the feelings of
nature.’”72 The accused “remained an ‘unfeeling fiend,’73 ‘insensible’ of
wrong-doing after the deed was done.”74
By the early twentieth century, the metaphorical body language of criminal
law found its way into popular literature. A notable cultural phenomenon of
the period was the rise in popularity of detective stories, crime novels, and
murder mysteries, many authored by women. Agatha Christie, Dorothy
Sayers, and others broke into the fiction market with tales depicting the
“middle classes . . . thoroughly riddled with dirty secrets.”75
Karen Halttunen notes that the popular literature of murder in the
nineteenth century cultivated ties between sex and violence. Through both
fictional and nonfictional genres emanated
67

Id. at 46.
Whichcote, supra note 65 (emphasis added).
69 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70 Id. (quoting NATHAN FISKE, A SERMON PREACHED AT BROOKFIELD, MARCH 6, 1778, ON THE DAY OF
INTERNMENT OF MR. JOSHUA SPOONER 6 (Thomas & John Fleet 1778)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Id. (quoting GEORGE KEATING, TRIAL OF JOHN GRAHAM AT BALTIMORE COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT ON
TUESDAY AUGUST 7, 1804, at 17 (Frayer & Clark 1804)).
72 Id. (quoting TRIAL OF EDWARD TINKER, MARINER, FOR THE WILLFUL MURDER OF A YOUTH CALLED
EDWARD AT CARTERET SUPERIOR COURT, SEPTEMBER TERM 1811, at 42–43 (Hall & Bryan and T. Watson
1811)).
73 Id. (quoting CONFESSION OF JOHN JOYCE, ALIAS, DAVID, WHO WAS EXECUTED ON MONDAY, THE
14TH OF MARCH, 1801, FOR THE MURDER OF MRS. SARAH CROSS 111 (Philadelphia 1808)).
74 Id. (quoting A CORRECT AND CONCISE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTING TRIAL OF JASON FAIRBANKS,
FOR THE BARBAROUS AND CRUEL MURDER OF ELIZABETH FALES AT THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, HOLDEN
AT DEDHAM, IN THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK, STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ON TUESDAY AUGUST 4, 1801
(Boston c. 1801)).
75 FRANCES GRAY, WOMEN, CRIME AND LANGUAGE 28 (2003).
68
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a major expression of the new pornography of pain and violence,
providing both an abundance of body-horror to cater to the new
excitement and a steady stream of disclaimers and apologies for its
own sensationalism, which merely reinforced the illicit thrill of
reading such literature. Murder literature was closely related to
sexual pornography, through its tendency to fuse sex with violence
on the grounds of their common obscenity, and its special interest in
crimes of passion, rape-murders, prostitute-killings, and abortion76
homicides.

Before the century was out, murder stories featuring women as sexual
objects and sexual actors were firmly grounded in popular literature.77 The late
nineteenth century especially saw growth in the publication of gendered
murder tales:
Readers were ushered into a world where pregnant single women
died at the hands of inept abortionists; rape victims were murdered by
their sexual assailants; rejected lovers killed their scornful
sweethearts, and successful seducers killed their pregnant cast-offs;
prostitutes were killed by their most favored clients; jealous husbands
murdered faithless wives, and adulterous husbands killed faithful
wives to mate with other women; husbands and brothers avenged the
honor of their women by killing their seducers; and experimenters in
sexual unorthodoxy saw their innovative arrangements erupt in
78
deadly violence.

By following some of the most sensational trials of the nineteenth century,
it is possible to see how linguistic shifts and developments played out in the
law itself. Over time, the language of mind and heart, reason and passion,
virtue and vice, self-control and violence was superimposed on the gendered
language of sex and male–female relationships.
In a nineteenth-century case, for example, we learn that James Eldredge
killed Sarah Jane Gould.79 As the prosecutor told the story, the accused
enticed his victim into a sexually compromising situation. From this evidence,
the jury could infer that Eldredge, acting outside the realm of reason, was
depraved. Eldredge, the prosecutor argued, had “beguiled the woman” and
“defiled her with his filthy embrace” before “cast[ing] his baleful eyes upon

76
77
78
79

HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 83.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 179.
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another object of desire” (Gould’s sister).80 He then “struck his envenomed,
poisoned fangs, into her bosom.”81 In this case, the male defendant is the
deviant, and it is his contemptible body and his conduct that are described with
such colorful language.
Before long, however, criminal law discourse began to reflect the
sexualization of violence—a situation in which sex, deemed to be a
presumptively female province, is pitted against male violence. In this
shadowbox, only one of two factors—sex or violence—is deemed the primary
causal element. An 1836 case involving the murder of Helen Jewett, a twentythree-year-old prostitute, is an example of how conflicting stories emerged in
the legal world.82 Evidence in the case strongly supported a finding that
Richard Robinson had committed the crime, killing Jewett with a hatchet blow
to her head and then burning her body in her bed.83 The defense framed the
question as one of competing credibility: of “reputable men” against
“disreputable women.”84 This categorization placed the defendant Robinson
squarely within the convention of the rational man—not cold, hard, or
insensible. Accordingly, some other explanation for his apparently irrational
(i.e., cold-hearted) behavior was needed. The explanation given in the press
was that he had been fooled and entrapped by the women’s appearance of
innocence.85 Sexuality, situated in the woman, was at fault.86
Robinson was acquitted after fifteen minutes of deliberations.87 The trial
judge had helped the defense by instructing the jury to disregard testimony by
“persons who lead most dissolute lives—who were inmates of a house of a bad
description . . . a house engaged in destroying both sexes.”88 Although
Robinson killed Jewett, he was “reputable”—a man whose heart was
80 Id. at 179 (emphasis omitted) (quoting THE TRIAL FOR MURDER OF JAMES E. ELDREDGE, CONVICTED
POISONING SARAH JANE GOULD 118 (Hitchcock, Tillotson & Stilwell’s Steam Presses 1857)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. at 179 (emphasis omitted) (quoting THE TRIAL FOR MURDER OF JAMES E. ELDREDGE, supra note
80, at 118) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 See id. at 199.
83 Id. at 199–200.
84 Id. at 202–03 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defense argued that Robinson had not killed
Jewett and suggested, without producing any affirmative evidence, that another prostitute may have murdered
her. Id.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 203 (“The Jewett murder offers the supreme example of how the violent death of a fallen
woman could be shaped by a Gothic narrative of sexual danger and ultimate guilt borne by the female of the
species.”).
87 Id.
88 Id.
OF
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apparently not depraved, and therefore not blameworthy. The women in the
brothel, and the deceased in particular, were never explicitly identified as
culpable parties, but the brothel was said to be hiding an unnamed evil, one
that was responsible for “destroying both sexes.” Within a few decades, that
evil came to be identified explicitly as female passion or, sometimes, simply
female sexuality.
One of the best known criminal cases of the nineteenth century involved
the murders of five women within close proximity to each other in the
Whitechapel district of London, committed by an unknown perpetrator who
came to be called “Jack the Ripper.”89 It has been argued that the unsolved
crimes, which were committed in 1888, marked the beginning of “The Age of
Sex Crime.”90 Each of the victims had some involvement in prostitution, a
factor that received intense attention in the press and in the multiplicity of
fictional and nonfictional stories that were written about the case.91 Intrigue
was generated not only by reference to the depraved heart of a presumably
irrational man, but also by the implicit depravity of the victims. The
conventional story line established these elements as an oppositional
dichotomy, one that would prove difficult to maintain.
Such dueling narratives of sex and violence may have been heralded by
Lord Blackstone. They perhaps first arose not in reference to guilt, but in the
context of legal responsibility. Having decreed that a woman loses her status
as an individual when she marries, Blackstone was forced to contemplate who
should be responsible for a wife’s commission of a crime.92 It was decided
that a married man would be held responsible for crimes committed by his wife
with three exceptions: treason, murder, and keeping a brothel.93 The last
exception is consistent with the idea that however much a woman’s identity
was subsumed in her husband’s, the circumstances in which a man would have
been held responsible for sexual transgressions were very limited.
By the twentieth century, the imagery of sex, violence, and authority had
become hopelessly entangled. Almost a century after the Whitechapel
murders, a man named Peter Sutcliffe was tried and convicted of thirteen
89

PHILIP SUGDEN, THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF JACK THE RIPPER xxv, 259–60 (1994).
GRAY, supra note 75, at 42 (crediting the writer and philosopher Colin Wilson with the phrase and
noting that Jane Caputi borrowed it for the title of her feminist text, The Age of Sex Crime).
91 See, e.g., id. at 45 (“The victims . . . were constructed even by the radical press as deserving their
fate . . . .”).
92 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 35.
93 Id.
90
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murders and seven assaults; all of his victims were women.94 The opposing
narratives—“depraved-heart criminal murders innocent lamb” and,
alternatively, “reputable and reasonable man kills seductive, fallen female”—
were already in place, along with the linguistic accoutrements. But the
evidence in the Sutcliffe case did not easily conform to either plotline. The
language used by investigators, as well as the popular press, shows how the
“depraved heart” of guilty killers became confused and intermingled with the
purportedly innocent, reasonable states of mind possessed by “reputable” men
caught up in taboo sexual activity when the two types of conduct overlapped.95
The confusion appears to be due at least in part to society’s inclination to
condemn women for any sexual conduct, even while finding abhorrent the
murderous actions of men.96
Despite efforts to untangle the mixed messages and to substitute the leaner,
minimalist language of science and modern news reports, the ambiguity
signaled in Sutcliffe is still present in women’s interactions with the criminal
justice system. The urge to pardon a man’s loss of control when sexual
relations are involved was long ago institutionalized in the “heat of passion”
defense, which could reduce murder to manslaughter. When allegations
involve murder of one’s adulterous spouse or her paramour, a claim of
uncontrollable rage in the face of such infidelity was deemed an exceptional
circumstance justifying less punishment.97 State v. Thornton,98 cited by
Professor Duncan, is typical. As the appellate court, modifying and remanding
the first-degree murder conviction, said in that case:
[T]he encountering by a spouse of the situation which occurred here
has been held, as a matter of law, to constitute sufficient provocation
to reduce a charge of homicide from one of the degrees of murder to
manslaughter absent actual malice, such as a previous grudge,
99
revenge, or the like.

Actual malice—with its emblematic image of a depraved heart—is thus
distinguishable from a reasonable response to provocation of the type that
incites passion.

94

GRAY, supra note 75, at 63.
Id. at 64 (attributing investigative errors in the Sutcliffe case to investigators’ inability to see the
murderer as “a product of patriarchal culture rather than as a freak of nature”).
96 See id. at 62–63, 73.
97 CLIFTON D. BRYANT, HANDBOOK OF DEATH & DYING 970 (2003).
98 730 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1987) (cited by Duncan, supra note 1, at 1217).
99 Id. at 309.
95
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While the language in the cases seems to camouflage gender-based
viewpoints, less expressive language does not necessarily advance a women’s
perspective any more definitively. A recent case involving the abuse of
women inmates is illustrative. It can be argued that nowhere is the intersection
of authority and violence more potent than in the correctional system. Indeed,
in this setting, authority may be a mask for violence. The added element of
female sexuality creates perfect storm conditions. The following excerpt from
Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections,100 expressed in what Professor
Duncan calls “steno-language,”101 is one court’s attempt to describe the
situation:
The case arises out of allegations that male corrections personnel
have systematically engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment of
female inmates incarcerated by the MDOC. Specifically, plaintiffs’
complaint alleged that the MDOC assigns male officers to the
housing units at all women’s facilities without providing any training
related to cross-gender supervision; that women are forced to dress,
undress, and perform basic hygiene and body functions in the open
with male officers observing; that defendants allow male officers to
observe during gynecological and other intimate medical care; that
defendants require male officers to perform body searches of women
prisoners that include pat-downs of their breasts and genital areas;
that women prisoners are routinely subjected to offensive sex-based
sexual harassment, offensive touching, and requests for sexual acts
by male officers; and that there is a pattern of male officers
requesting sexual acts from women prisoners as a condition of
retaining good-time credits, work details, and educational and
102
rehabilitative program opportunities.

The court’s description is almost devoid of imagery, possibly because there is
no familiar story that the court could allude to. Yet this clinical recitation is
itself a “mystifying cloud,” almost completely hiding this single empirical,
quantitative fact: “This action involves over five hundred plaintiffs . . . .”103
While the court imposes liability, the language fails to convey any real shift in
perspective. The removal of the colorful verbiage does not change the
underlying or continuing confusion about causation and fault.

100

Neal v. Dep’t of Corr., 592 N.W.2d. 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1238 n.229 (“Steno-language refers to utterances that have a ‘fixed set of
associations,’ the same in every context.” (quoting WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 43, at 50)).
102 Neal, 592 N.W.2d at 372.
103 Neal v. Dep’t of Corr., 2009 WL 187813, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009) (per curiam).
101
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2. Heat of Passion: Fire
The heat of passion defense, with its associated language of “cooling off,”
“rekindling,” and, eventually “extreme emotional disturbance,”104 derives from
the earlier language of depraved hearts and lost reason. Historically, the
concept flows from the ideal of the passionless woman, an ideal that arose
from the need to protect the rational man from a Circean allure.105 The logic
goes something like this: If it is assumed that man is rational and violent crime
is irrational, then the normal, rational man will not commit such crimes; only
the exceptional, irrational man will do so. But the rational man cannot be
expected to be immune to all sexual overtures or to remain calm in the face of
assaults on his masculine identity. What happens, then, if a man acts rationally
in responding to sexual inducement and then turns to violence? To hold men
blameless, or at least find them to be sympathetic when sexual conduct was
involved, the public had to look elsewhere to assign fault.
An underlying difficulty here is that women have been historically
problematic legal subjects. A married woman’s legal identity merged into that
of her husband, but commercial interests required that unmarried women be
recognized as individuals in the market place.106 A single woman, with her
future status in constant doubt since she could marry and lose her individual
identity, could not be reliably viewed as an independent agent.107 The social
culture pushed to remove the uncertain status, treating a woman’s unfettered
sexuality as teeming with risk. Thus, one solution to the dilemma was to
conclude that because a “fallen” woman naturally incites even a rational man’s
passion, only passionless women deserve sympathy.108 It also follows that any
woman of “passion” can be presumed to be “fallen.” According to Karen
Halttunen, the ultimate “sexualization of the female murder victim” in print
and in the public imagination thus “rested, ironically, on the passionless female
ideal.”109 The image of the fallen woman had no early American counterpart,

104

See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 183 (“The sexualization of the female murder victim rested, ironically,
on the passionless female ideal.”).
106 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 35.
107 Id. at 146.
108 See, e.g., HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 210 (noting in discussion of prostitute Helen Jewett’s murder
that despite expressions of sympathy in the press, accounts “clearly suggested that Jewett’s death was
ultimately deserved”).
109 Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
105
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yet it became fixed as the opposite of a sexless woman who would not provoke
a man’s passions with her own.110
Again, linguistic shifts and developments reflecting these ideas played out
in the law itself. In the nineteenth century, the young Henry Leander Foote
wrote an account of his life, including his murder of his cousin Emily
Cooper.111 Foote killed his cousin following a trip to New York City during
which he consorted with prostitutes.112 He claimed that obsessive thoughts
about his sexual experiences in the city motivated the homicide: “But with
shame! shame! do I write it, I now proceeded to examine her [Cooper’s]
person, which inflamed my baser passion to an unmanageable degree; and after
my eyes were satisfied, I violated and robbed her of her virgin purity.” Then,
“held ‘entirely in the power of Satan,’ he slit her throat.”113 Early connections
between notions of a culpable “depraved heart” and the rational man’s
understandable departure from reason due to the instigations of “fallen
women” can be seen in Foote’s account of his crime. The contrast of hard
factual detail and soft imagery is also apparent.
In the twentieth century, examples abound of murderous conduct defended
by reference to passionate, fallen, unworthy women. A 1930 Tennessee case
relied on by the Thornton court, which involved the murder of the defendant’s
wife’s paramour, is illustrative. The appellate court noted:
[I]f as a matter of fact, the deceased had debauched the wife of
plaintiff in error, and the plaintiff in error had been apprised of that
fact and had become convinced of its truth . . . and, with reasonable
expedition, while under the influence of passion and agitation
produced by such information, had killed [the paramour], he would
114
only have been guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

By the time this case was decided, the story of the cuckolded husband was
familiar and required only a slight reference to the “influence of passion.”
The language of passion run amok was often intertwined with racial
implications. One example is the case in which Session Boyd, a black man,

110

Id.
Id. at 203.
112 Id. at 205.
113 Id. (quoting from HENRY LEANDER FOOTE, A SKETCH
LEANDER FOOTE (1850)).
114 Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930).
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was tried for the murder of a white woman with whom he had an affair.115
Boyd’s wife (also a white woman) was reputed to be “a hooker,” and Boyd,
according to expert psychiatric testimony, was “predisposed” to act
irrationally.116 The victim was alleged to have acted provocatively, instigating
“gossip and rumors” about the Boyd’s wife, including accusations that she was
a “truck stop girl” and planned to leave Boyd and move in with another black
man.117 The commingling of two familiar stories—the white trash hooker and
the primitive black man—perpetuated stereotypes that need no further
explanation.
A few years after Boyd, a federal court in New York struggled to adapt the
language of passion to changing sensibilities in the case of Grant v.
Dalsheim.118 The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter for killing his
wife’s lover.119 Not inclined to excuse the defendant’s behavior as readily as
some earlier courts might have done, the court was nevertheless mindful of the
still prevailing image of the prudent husband incensed and driven to irrational
behavior. Denying the defendant’s request that his conviction be overturned
because of prejudicial remarks by the prosecution, the court noted:
The prosecutor’s remarks must be considered in context . . . . A
review of the prosecutor’s summation indicates that it was in
response to a highly emotional plea on behalf of petitioner based
upon finding his wife in flagrante delicto. The prosecutor was
justified in using robust argument in response to avoid the
substitution of sympathy for reasoned consideration of the evidence
offered to sustain the indictment charge. The prosecution had the
right to ward off the emotional appeal and to remind the jurors that
no matter how enraged the petitioner may have been because he
found his wife in bed with another man, he had no right to kill him—
that they were to decide the case upon the evidence and the
120
applicable law.

Even as the court sought to downplay the element of passion in defining the
jury’s role, it employed the kind of loaded language that might encourage a
“substitution of sympathy for reasoned consideration of the evidence.” Words
and phrases like “highly emotional,” “robust argument,” “ward off
115
116
117
118
119
120

Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282 (Del. 1978).
Id. at 1284–86.
Id. at 1284.
Grant v. Dalsheim, 535 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1385.
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[emotions],” and “enraged” suggest that more is at issue than a detached,
logical assessment of evidence.
The language of fire and passion persists despite legislative attempts to
modify it by—most notably, as Professor Duncan points out—turning the “heat
of passion” defense into the more generic “extreme emotional disturbance”
defense.121 Certainly in cases complicated by the unresolved conflict of a
presumptively rational man faced with a woman who audaciously incites his
sexual passions, courts cling to the passionless woman ideal and the
accompanying language of fire. Thus, for example, in a 1999 case in which
the defense of extreme emotional disturbance was invoked by a man who had
killed one prostitute and had attempted to kill another,122 the court’s
instructions to the jury included the following language: “While the emotional
disturbance need not necessarily have been a spontaneous or sudden
occurrence or caused by any particular provoking event, indeed [it] may have
simmered in the defendant’s mind for [a] long period of time, the disturbance
must actually have influenced his conduct at the time of the killing.”123 While
courts and legislatures may be moving away from the old metaphors of fire and
flame, heat and cold, the ideas surrounding men and women that in many ways
helped formulate this language linger, keeping the language alive.
3. Attempt: Journey
Not surprisingly, the fire metaphor at times overlaps with images of hell,
damnation, and salvation. Closely connected to these images are themes of
place and time and references to the transition from dark to light (or light to
dark). In criminal law, these themes and images are perhaps most developed in
relation to the crime of attempt and the justification of self-defense.
A key phrase in the law of attempt that Professor Duncan highlights is
locus poenitentiae, the place where salvation happens.124 Because criminal
acts follow a trajectory from conception to completion, it is possible to think of
a criminal act as a kind of journey and of the actor as one en route to a bad end.
The road to salvation can be interrupted by seduction, but, conversely, a person
on the road to damnation can make a turn toward grace. Thus, as Professor

121

Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206.
State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902 (Conn. 1999).
123 Id. at 911 (emphasis added) (quoting the trial court’s instructions to the jury on extreme emotional
disturbance).
124 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1222.
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Duncan suggests, the convict, like the sinner—or as a sinner—always has the
potential to be saved.125
The idea of salvation is embedded in the American system of punishment,
demonstrated by the historical emphasis on saving the soul right up to the point
of execution.126 The pursuit of salvation was a motivating factor in the
establishment of U.S. prisons, and punishment has always been accompanied
by spiritual advice.127 According to the doctrine of the atonement, an idea
subscribed to by early English settlers, “a repentant murderer enjoyed the same
access to free grace as any other sinner.”128
Halttunen relates the story of Esther Rodgers, an American tale of the
spiritual journey to salvation. Rodgers was born in Maine in 1680.129 She was
apprenticed at the age of thirteen and, at seventeen, “committed her first
murder, stopping the breath of her newborn child, the fruit of an illicit liaison
with a Negro serving in the same household.”130 The crime, however, went
undetected until a few years later, when Rodgers again gave birth and then
buried the (possibly stillborn) infant.131 Upon discovery of the infant’s body,
Rodgers was prosecuted, and she then confessed to the earlier homicide.132
In 1701, John Rogers, a preacher, published Esther Rodgers’s confession,
along with three “execution sermon[s]” he made on Esther Rodgers’s behalf
before her execution, in a booklet entitled Death the Certain Wages of Sin of
the Impenitent.133 In it, Reverend Rogers focuses on “the spiritual pilgrimage
of Esther Rodgers as she moved from a state of religious indifference to
overwhelming conviction of sin to a strong hope, as her execution drew near,
in her salvation.”134 Halttunen highlights that, according to John Rogers,
Esther Rodgers was “[o]nce an irreligious, unchaste woman willing to destroy
her own child to conceal her vicious conduct, [but] had been spiritually
transformed during her eight months of bondage, and had emerged from prison
125

See id.
See HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 20 (noting that the practice of reading a criminal’s confessions
aloud was “a central part of execution ritual”).
127 Nancy L. Cook, The Sky in a Box: Reflections on Prisons, Preachers, Storytelling and Salvation, 3
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 135, 140 (2002) (discussing the religious foundations of American prisons).
128 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 20.
129 Id. at 7.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 7–8.
134 Id. at 8.
126
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‘Sprinkled, Cleansed, Comforted, a Candidate of Heaven.’”135 The idea of
opportunity for grace is carried over in Rogers’s exhortation to the public who
witnessed Esther Rodgers’s execution. “This Serves only to draw the Curtain,”
he said, “that thou mayst behold a Tragick Scene, strangely changed into a
Theater of Mercy.”136
While the possibility of finding a path to salvation was believed to exist up
until the moment of death, there was the countervailing possibility of falling
from a righteous path at any moment. And historically, crime narratives have
reflected this belief with regard to the potential for temptation, seduction, or
falling from the path to heaven. With respect to women, one such narrative
aligns feminine beauty with weakness; weakness leads to sin and therefore
justifies men’s authority over women. This same beauty can be deceptive,
disorienting the male observer with “‘confused, uncertain images’ which are
the hallmark of the ‘grander passions.’”137 The idea of the female body as a
“deceitful maze”138 places women in the role of entrapper or seducer—the
Medusa with her “tempestuous loveliness of terror.”139 Following this logic, in
the nineteenth century, medical experts tried to show connections among
prostitution, crime, and insanity. For example, after visiting Parisian
prostitution circles, prisons, asylums, and hospitals, Dr. Augustus Kinsley
Gardner, an averred specialist in both obstetrics and insanity, reported his
findings on the relationship between female sexuality and insanity and the
impact of these variables on criminal deviance.140
These attitudes have also been expressed in crime narratives. In the 1936
case of Helen Jewett’s murder, reports of the young woman’s demise “by the
hatchet of the midnight assassin[] and the flame of the incendiary”141 present
135 Id. (quoting John Rogers, Jr., The Declaration and Confession of Esther Rodgers, 1701, in THE
ENGLISH LITERATURES OF AMERICA, 1500–1800, at 404, 404 (Myra Jehlen & Michael Warner eds., 1997)).
The Declaration and Confession of Esther Rodgers originally was published as part of Death and Certain
Wages of Sin of the Impenitent. THE ENGLISH LITERATURES OF AMERICA, 1500–1800, supra at 404.
136 John Rogers, Jr., supra note 135, at 404 (emphasis added).
137 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 20 (quoting EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN
OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL 79 (Harper & Brother Publishers 1860) (1757)).
138 Id. (quoting BURKE, supra note 137, at 145).
139 Percy Bysshe Shelley, On the Medusa of Leonardo da Vinci in the Florentine Gallery, in 1 POEMS FOR
THE MILLENNIUM l, 32 (Jerome Rothenberg & Jeffrey C. Robinson eds., 2009).
140 G.J. BARKER-BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN LIFE: MALE ATTITUDES TOWARD
WOMEN AND SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 83 (1976).
141 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 201 (quoting THE LIFE OF ELLEN JEWETT; ILLUSTRATIVE OF HER
ADVENTURES WITH VERY IMPORTANT INCIDENTS, FROM HER SEDUCTION TO THE PERIOD OF HER MURDER,
TOGETHER WITH VARIOUS EXTRACTS FROM HER JOURNAL, CORRESPONDENCE, AND POETICAL EFFUSIONS 45
(New York 1836)). The Life of Ellen Jewett is one of several pamphlets that was published around the time of
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the chronology as a logical progression from a move into a brothel to a tragic
end. It was not the perpetrator’s situation that caught the public’s attention but
the victim’s journey from innocence to sin to a fiery end—described in the
intertwined language of sex and violence. Karen Halttunen explains:
That envious working girl had failed to see “the future picture of the
burnt and blackened body, and the ghastly gashes in the brain, which
were to be the epilogue of the fine show and false delight.” When
popular accounts described Jewett “with her transparent forehead half
divided with a butcher’s stroke, and her silver skin burnt to a cinder
where it was not laced with blood . . .” they suggested that [her] death
142
was the inevitable result of her sexual fall.

Henry Leander Foote’s similar accounts of his own crimes portrayed
prostitutes as the activating agents.143 As discussed, Foote not only raped and
killed his cousin following an episodic consortium with prostitutes; he also
killed his mother when she took away the liquor he had begun to imbibe
freely.144 In his account, Foote blamed liquor, prostitutes, and “licentious
novels” for his conduct.145 Specifically with regard to the prostitutes, he
reproved “those fine looking women” who “array themselves in the most gay
costume, adorn their persons with pearls, rings, paint, and jewels, and perfume
themselves till they smell as sweet as an oriental garden to enchant and
bewitch young men.”146 Having been “enticed” by the “snares, arts, and
devices of the harlot,” he was not in control.147
By the mid-twentieth century, the distinctions between the rational man
unwittingly seduced and the cold-hearted man with a depraved heart and
between the virginal, passionless woman and the fiery seductress were
routinely woven into the analysis of crimes that crossed gender lines. These
distinctions are drawn in the Sutcliffe murder case, which involved multiple
victims.148 Investigators sorted out relatively “deserving” victims from the

Helen Jewett’s murder and refers to Helen Jewett as Ellen Jewett. See Patricia Cline Cohen, The Helen Jewett
Murder: Violence, Gender, and Sexual Licentiousness in Antebellum America, 2 NWSA J. 374, 380–82
(1990). (Due to the limited availability of the pamphlet, the page numbers are taken from secondary sources.).
142 Id. (quoting GEORGE WILKES & H.R. HOWARD, THE LIVES OF HELEN JEWETT AND RICHARD P.
ROBINSON 40, 119 (T.B. Peterson 1849) [hereinafter THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON]).
143 Id. at 203–05.
144 Id. at 205.
145 Id. at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113, at 35) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146 Id. at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113, at 35–37) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 Id. at 206 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113, at 39–43) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 GRAY, supra note 75, at 63.
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“innocent” based on the linguistic doublethink of whore/victim.149 The chief
investigator in the case picked up on Sutcliffe’s judgments about his victims:
that by walking alone at night, walking slowly, or making gestures that could
be interpreted as being provocative, Sutcliffe’s victims triggered a kind of
“insane” response from him.150 The police were put on the defensive by
Sutcliffe’s twisted assertions of victim fault, prompting assurances at a press
conference that they intended to “continue to arrest prostitutes” and were
concerned about the possibility that “innocent girls” were being targeted.151
Throughout history, a thread of mitigation has run through criminal law
discourse that suggests a reduced culpability on the part of the perpetrator
when crime was triggered by sexual temptation. Sir Robert Anderson, lead
investigator in the “Jack the Ripper” case, writes in his memoir, The Lighter
Side of My Official Life, that warning prostitutes off the streets brought an end
to the deadly crime spree of the never-found murderer, thus implying that the
women’s conduct had been the main source of the problem.152 At the same
time, there are suggestions in criminal law literature that the women, rather
than the perpetrators, can find redemption. Even Harriet Vane, the talented,
independent protagonist of Dorothy Sayers’s detective novels, can be viewed
as a woman who has found her way when at last she marries. In the eyes of
many readers, says Frances Gray, “[Vane’s] marriage to Peter Wimsey
redeems her past.”153
4. The Castle Doctrine: Feudal Past
Some of criminal law’s historical connections go back much further than
the Enlightenment or Victorian times: The law of self-defense, like the law of
attempt, hearkens back to the feudal era in England. By its very appellation,
the castle doctrine of self-defense evokes the history and social culture of
medieval times. The castle doctrine is framed in much the same way as the
heat-of-passion exemption: a justifiable response to an unendurable affront.
The language associated with claims of right (in the case of self-defense) and
claims of mitigation (in cases of attempt and heat of passion) suggests

149
150
151
152
153

Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 73 (quoting an October 1979 newspaper article from the Evening News).
Id. at 45 (citing SIR ROBERT ANDERSON, THE LIGHTER SIDE OF MY OFFICIAL LIFE 197 (1994)).
Id. at 29.
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necessity, inevitability, and timelessness.154 And in cases where women are
implicated as criminal actors, victims, or essential third parties, this language
reflects the refinements of social judgments about the men and women
involved.
The eloquent phrases defining self-defense and attempt fittingly reflect the
paradoxes in law and society. The castle conjures up images of knights in
armor, battlements, the defense of property, and assertions of right and might.
Within this world, women were property, part of the owned estate.155 There
were exceptions to this principle; unmarried women (and even married women
in some circumstances) could own property in their own right.156 For the
general principle that women were property to hold true, two accommodations
were made: married women who owned property were treated in law, though
not in reality, as femmes sole; and unmarried women were treated as not-yetmarried women.157 This conception preserved the identity of men as kings of
the castle. It also marginalized independent women, putting social interactions
with them or their oft-presumed equivalents, “fallen women,” on a different
footing.
One manifestation of the friction between woman-as-property and womanas-property-owner can be seen in the evolution of the discourse surrounding
the crime of rape. Rape was for many centuries considered a crime against
property—a man’s property.158 Consensual sex between a woman and a man
who was not her husband meant the ruination of the woman’s future, and
consent was presumed in the absence of clearly expressed resistance.159 A
woman could exercise free will by consenting to or refusing sexual relations,
but these actions were not on her own behalf.160 And once she, as “property,”

154 The appellation comes from the adage, “A man’s home is his castle.” As Joel Prentiss Bishop
explained in “Defence of the Castle” in his 1877 criminal treatise, “it may now be deemed to be reasonably
clear, that, to prevent an unlawful entrance into the dwelling-house, the occupant may make defense to the
taking of life, without being liable for even manslaughter.” 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW § 707, at 393 (6th ed. 1877); see also Nancy L. Cook, In Celia’s Defense: Transforming the
Story of Property Acquisition in Sexual Harassment Cases into a Feminist Castle Doctrine, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL.
& L. 197, 287 (1999).
155 Cook, supra note 154, at 247–48 (discussing the history of the legal concept of women as property).
156 See CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 145–46 (discussing the legal treatment of women property owners).
157 Id.
158 GRAY, supra note 75, at 85.
159 See id. (“Under the Deuteronomic code, a betrothed woman discovered having sex with another man
in the town could be executed on the grounds that her transgression was voluntary ‘because she did not cry for
help.’”).
160 Id.
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was “damaged” and rendered worthless, there was nothing to be done but
destroy or discard her, a fate imposed even on those identified as “innocents”
and “true” victims.161 Even literature seemed unable to find any other way to
rectify the contradictions while preserving men’s dominant status.
Within these narratives are the images of darkness and light. The castle is
not only associated with royalty, Arthurian romance, and power but also with
the cold and dark of stone walls, dungeons, secret passages, intrigue, and
horror.162 Reason, that central characteristic of the “Enlightenment” man,
represents a quest for light.163 Blackstone, who compares law to a Gothic
castle, sees more in the symbolism than awe-inspiring authority; he also sees
mystery, the timeless void of human origins—a wild, shadowy nature to be
tamed.164 The mission of the rational man is to exercise control over nature.
But the dark side of nature is always threatening, and one potential source of
the darkness is the female of the species.
The rational man’s defense to murder reveals this mindset. One
explanation for Peter Sutcliffe’s murderous spree was his claim that the first
murder was provoked by a prostitute’s taunt regarding his sexual
inadequacy.165 Sutcliffe’s inability to assume a proper role in relation to a
woman of dark passions created a “cocktail of frustration, guilt and
humiliation” that understandably, according to press reports, “could lead to
fury.”166 Reports of Richard Robinson’s murder of Helen Jewett in a New
York City brothel also suggest a rational response to the deep, dark threats
within and outside the castle walls. Further, they suggest that Jewett’s death
was ultimately deserved. Discussing that case, one commentator described
prostitutes as “a troop of gaudy poisoners, teeming with disease,” allowed to
“stream through the street, carrying death beneath their skirts.”167 Thus, a
161

See, e.g., Judy M. Cornett, The Treachery of Perception: Evidence and Experience in Clarissa, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 165, 177 n.79 (1994) (describing the plot of Samuel Richardson’s novel Clarissa, in which the
protagonist “eventually withers away and dies” after being raped); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE RAPE OF
LUCRECE ll. 1700–16 (where Lucrece, the victim of a rape, commits suicide); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TITUS
ANDRONICUS act 5, sc. 3 (where Titus kills his own daughter, Lavinia, to protect her from the shame of living
as a rape victim).
162 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 127–28.
163 See id. at 24 (discussing the idea that, according to Hobbes, man’s “being in the dark” creates anxiety
that motivates a desire for knowledge, i.e., “enlightenment”).
164 Id. at 27 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *33).
165 GRAY, supra note 75, at 67–68.
166 Id. at 68 (quoting a London Observer article published May 7, 1981).
167 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at
79) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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woman like Helen Jewett, who would “entice the wayfarer with her
blandishments, and willfully and basely light a fire in his bones . . . should be
treated as a murderess.”168 The rational man’s death blow to such a woman
could be construed, “like the slaying of Medusa, as an act of just retribution
and collective male self-defense.”169 A New York Herald story similarly
employed blame-shifting language: “How could a young man perpetrate so
brutal an act? Is it not more like the work of a woman? Are not the whole
train of circumstances within the ingenuity of a female, abandoned and
desperate?”170 Incorporating the imagery of fire and pestilence, ancient Greek
wisdom, and the innocent wayfarer, these stories imply an undeniable and
inevitable conclusion that the male perpetrator’s conduct was justified.
As white western women sought more independence, and the law granted
them more legal rights and privileges, the story language that had been
developing in criminal justice continued to have significant impact on their
fates. A highly publicized case in England in the early 1920s involved Edith
Thompson, who was hanged as an accomplice (along with her paramour, the
actual killer) for the murder of her husband.171 Thompson’s case illustrates the
continuing uncertainty of the place of women in western culture, even as the
law was evolving. Thompson was steeped in romantic tradition, a fact
reflected in letters she wrote to her lover, which were filled with references to
romantic novels and the trappings of a freethinking society.172 While she
describes herself as behaving in the detached and passionless manner expected
of women—at the Waldorf, waiting to have tea, wearing a black frock—she
nevertheless situates herself as a modern, independent woman, free to flirt and
enjoy life’s adventures.173 She thereby puts herself outside the castle’s
protection. The circumstantial evidence of her complicity in her husband’s
murder relied on the narrative model of a romantic Victorian-turnedindependent woman unredeemed. Ultimately, in the public eye, she seemed to

168 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 202 (citing DANIEL A. COHEN, PILLARS OF SALT, MONUMENTS OF GRACE: NEW ENGLAND CRIME
LITERATURE AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 1674–1860, at 21 (1993) (quoting a New
York Herald article published April 14, 1836)).
171 GRAY, supra note 75, at 20.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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become the castle’s ghost, neither evil woman of passion nor cool hostess of
virtue.174
Recent events highlight how these historical patterns have had dire
consequences for women in modern times. For example, in 1994, female
inmates of Michigan’s prisons brought suit in federal court alleging civil rights
violations through multiple acts of physical abuse and sexual harassment.
Newspaper reports of the trial noted that “[t]he women’s stories were different,
and yet the same.”175 Most of the women said they had not reported the
abuse.176 “There was no point, they testified,” because nothing would be
done.177 Moreover, there was great risk, according to the women’s testimony,
because “officers could and did retaliate with tickets for misconduct that could
put them in isolation, and cost them access to their education, visitation, and
even their release.”178 In this narrative are echoes of the impregnable castle,
fortified and controlled by the men who own it. Press coverage of the case
repeatedly described the prison environment as one in which a “culture of
impunity” reigned.179 “Culture of impunity,” a term often associated with
torture and genocide, is perhaps part of the new millennium’s beautiful
language, a late-century model of darkness, dungeons, and unrestrained
natures. It suggests, in this context, that the guards and prison officials who
engaged in rape, sexual assault, intimidation, and other forms of abuse against
female inmates acted with a “depraved heart,” but without fear of punishment.
Thus, the evocative poetic language of the criminal law is transformed and
comes full circle.
C. Professor Duncan’s Linguistic Theory in Context
Professor Duncan’s analysis of why courts might choose to lean on the
poetic language of criminal law readily applies in the context of women in the
criminal justice system. Participants in the system use the language she quotes
in this context as much as, if not more often than, in other contexts as a way of
evading precise definition. The evocative power of language is particularly
174 Id. at 24 (describing Edith Thompson as a “silenced object to be looked at”—both a “spectacle to
incite compassion” and an “unclean” woman threatening social stability).
175 Susan L. Oppat, Prison Guard Abuse Lawsuit Goes to Jury, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 31, 2008,
available at http://blog.mlive.com/annarbornews/2008/01/prison_guard_abuse_lawsuit_goe.html.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Eric D. Campbell, Women Prisoners’ Lawsuit Addresses MDOC Abuse, MICH. CITIZEN, Sept. 25,
2009 (quoting U.S. Human Rights Watch director David Fahti).
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evident when matters of gender are implicitly at issue. Historical associations
also can be easily seen; indeed, where women are concerned, allusions to
cultural markers might be viewed as a well-oiled slope to preserve historical,
gender-based rights and privileges.
1. Evasion of Precise Definition
One reason frequently given as to why the language of criminal law stories,
in case law and elsewhere, tends to be vague, impressionistic, or imprecise is
that the subject matter of mystery and horror does not lend itself to easy
description. Writing about the difficulty in conveying a story of death, because
its discovery that comes only in sensory perceptions, Virginia Woolf asserts,
“[W]e cannot possibly break out of the frame of the picture by speaking natural
words.”180 This reasoning has been used over time to account for writers’ and
tellers’ inability to articulate with any exactitude the events, causes, and
consequences of serious violence. “Language is incapable of giving utterance
to the feelings that shock the soul as its horrors and enormities are brought
before us,” states one nineteenth-century author.181 In part, says Karen
Halttunen, this belief has been “[s]haped by the . . . dominance of legal
narrative, [wherein] murder remains a ‘mystery,’ fragmentary and open-ended,
resistant to full moral closure.”182 Halttunen herself accepts this perspective,
observing:
True-crime literature is engaged in an endless exploration of a
question to which we have no satisfying answer. All it can do is to
repeat over and over again, with each horrifying revelation of some
new case, that murder is fundamentally a mystery—resistant to full
knowledge and moral comprehension—and a horror—unspeakable,
183
unimaginable, inexplicable.

In order to convey what is understood to be true, the reporter requires “a
language beyond the literal.”184
This may be one explanation for the imprecision of language in criminal
law, but it is likely that there are other reasons as well. For instance, in many
criminal matters, the ambiguous language may be used to hide our shame.
180

VIRGINIA WOOLF, Three Pictures, in DEATH OF THE MOTH AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (1942).
HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 73 (quoting an unspecified mid-nineteenth-century popular murder
anthology) (internal citation marks omitted).
182 Id. at 242.
183 Id. at 244.
184 GRAY, supra note 75, at 93.
181
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Four different examples involving intimate relationships with women can be
used to demonstrate how shame plays a role in transference, denial, avoidance,
and self-deception, possibly accounting for some uncertain or unclear
language: seventeenth-century law on infanticide; eighteenth-century defenses
to charges of infanticide; conditions in women’s prisons in modern times; and
investigative findings into conditions in modern women’s prisons.
The idea of shame was explicit in the lexicon of English and early AngloAmerican law. The preamble to a 1624 infanticide statute, which called for the
execution of any mother of a dead infant in the absence of proof that the child
had been born dead, is illustrative: “WHEREAS many lewd women that have
been delivered of bastard children, to avoid their shame, and to escape
punishment, do secretly bury or conceal the death of their children, and after, if
the child be found dead, the said woman do allege, that the said child was born
dead,” guilt was presumed and the ultimate punishment was required.185
Applicable only to unmarried women, whose “lewd[ness]” was the family’s
and the community’s shame, the situations to which the statute referred were
often described in general terms.186 One account of a 1679 case, for example,
reported that the accused, “consenting that she was never married,” had been
convicted of “a crime in itself so horrible and unnatural, as one would think no
person, especially of that sex, which is considered the most tender hearted and
merciful, could be guilty of such an inhumane Impiety.”187 The crime referred
to is infanticide—murder—even though the proof consisted only of evidence
that the defendant delivered the child and did so without a witness present to
attest to the child either not having been alive at birth or having died of natural
causes.188 Here, shame is used as justification for criminalization and to
silence those to whom the shame attaches. Vague language ensures that a full
delineation of events is not revealed.
Within the next half century, women would use shame as a defense
strategy. If a woman could provide evidence of her own virtue and proof of
seduction by an irrational man, she might convince a court that she “did it to
hide Shame.”189 By cloaking herself in shame, and giving up a claim to fully

185

CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 87–88 (citing the preamble to Statute of James I, 1634, c. 27, § 21 (Eng.)).
Id. at 88.
187 Id. (quoting PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND AND
NEW ENGLAND 1558–1803, at 67 (1981)).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 89 (citing the case of Sarah Hayes, decided April 9, 1746, Proceedings of the Old Bailey); see
also Sarah Hayes, Killing, The Proceedings of the Old Bailey—London’s Central Criminal Court, 1674–1913,
186
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autonomous agency, an unmarried woman might preserve some measure of
status or, at least, her life.190 The trade-off was that women would be regarded
as “real objects of our greatest pity.”191 The “cause of this most horrid
crime”—infanticide—was deemed to be “an excess of what is really a virtue,
of the sense of shame, or modesty.”192 The language remains nebulous, but the
veiled cause of the crime—shame—is now identified as a virtue rather than a
vice.
A more recent example, drawn from the reflections of women inmates on
dysfunctional intimate relationships that contributed to their involvement in the
criminal justice system, suggests women have internalized shame in
connection with sexual identity, if not as a virtue, at least as an understood
expectation. In the late twentieth century, as in the mid-eighteenth century,
this assumption of shame created conflicts for women caught up in the
criminal justice system. In strikingly clear terms, one inmate in the New York
prison system explains it this way:
A lot of women in here won’t be woman enough to say that they were
abused by a man. I want women to know that I was abused by a man
and I’m doing time for a man, and that’s something I’m never going
to do again once I’m released. I’m not that proud; I was used by this
193
man, I was abused by this man, and I went through enough.

It is not only the abused themselves who experience shame; even those who
recognize and condemn acts of abuse employ language that hides the real
experience. The female Michigan inmates who filed the suit alleged that they
were required to
perform basic hygiene and body functions in the open with male
officers observing; that defendants allow male officers to observe
during gynecological and other intimate medical care. . . that women
prisoners [were] routinely subjected to offensive sex-based sexual
harassment, offensive touching, and requests for sexual acts by male
officers; and that there [was] a pattern of male officers requesting
sexual acts from women prisoners as a condition of retaining good-

http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=t17460409-47-defend695&div=t17460409-47#highlight (last
visited June 5, 2010).
190 See id.
191 Id. at 90 (citing THE LETTERS OF ERASMUS DARWIN 42 (Desmond King-Hele ed., 1981).
192 Id. (citation omitted).
193 PAULA C. JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON 129 (2003)
(discussing the story of Marilyn).
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time credits, work details, and educational and rehabilitative program
194
opportunities.

Having eliminated the coded language of passion and fire, writings that
examine women and men in the criminal justice system now substitute a
different coded language, one that is equally indefinite and vague.
Legislatures, courts, and others in the criminal justice system have
attempted to neutralize the language of criminal law, replacing, for example,
“heat of passion” with “extreme emotional disturbance” and avoiding charged
terminology. But the result isn’t necessarily any different and may spring from
the same motivation—a disinclination to confront the experience of shame. In
one case cited by Professor Duncan, the testimony an expert witness about the
defendant’s state of mind and the court’s explanation of the applicable law are
evasive to the point of being self-deceptive.195 The psychiatrist’s conclusions
on the issue of extreme emotional disturbance were expressed: “Like as in any
love, there is hate and with passive people there is more love on the surface
than hate and this came out. He was predisposed to his personality at times to
overreact with repressed hostility.”196 The court, amplifying the confusion,
charged the jury:
There must be a reasonable explanation for the existence of the
extreme emotional disturbance or distress. It is not the person who
must be reasonable at the time because a reasonable man would not
intentionally kill another person; it is the frenzy of mind based upon a
197
reasonable explanation which is basic to the jury’s determination.

Relying on the assumption that men are reasonable, and only a man far outside
the norm or justly provoked would engage in such violence, the court’s
language here raises a question of whether, in the circumstances of this case,
those involved in the trial were unable to fit the facts into the presumptive
norm.198

194

Neal v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 N.W.2d. 370, 372 (Mich. 1998) (emphasis added).
See Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Del. 1978). Professor Duncan references Boyd in Duncan,
supra note 1, at 1206.
196 Boyd, 389 A.2d at 1286.
197 Id. at 1288 (emphasis omitted).
198 The case came out of rural Delaware in 1978, and the defendant, a black man married to a white
woman, had killed his white paramour. Id. at 1282.
195
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2. Power of Language
Certainly, the criminal law’s language is as memorable, evocative, and
associative with respect to women as it is in other contexts. Romantic motifs
and subliminal messages abound in this as in other forms of reportage. As
Toni Morrison writes:
The symbolic language that emanates from unforeseen events
supplies media with the raw material from which a narrative
emerges—already
scripted,
fully
spectacularized
and
riveting . . . . Underneath the commodified story (of violence, sex,
race, etc.) is a cultural one. . . . The spectacle is the narrative; the
narrative is spectacularized and both monopolize appearance and
social reality. Interested only in developing itself, the spectacle is
199
immune to correction.

In some sense, the symbiosis between narrative and spectacle has always
been part of the criminal justice system. Professor Duncan elucidates
historical differences in public manifestations of the relationship, specifically
in the Romantic and overtly scientific Enlightenment eras. She quotes
historian and philosopher Richard Tarnas: “For the Romantic reality was
symbolically resonant through and through, and was therefore fundamentally
multivalent, a constantly changing complex of many-leveled meanings, even of
opposites. For the Enlightenment-scientific mind, in contrast, reality was
concrete and literal, univocal.”200 The nineteenth century ushered in the
practice of looking to cultural context for causational clues, leading to social
and behavioral consequences of the sort Toni Morrison identifies. As a
“humanitarian revolution” took hold, the symbiosis changed in appearance,
though not in its fundamental character.201
This nineteenth-century
“humanitarian revolution in sensibility . . . introduced a whole range of new
attitudes towards violence, pain, and death, [and] provided the necessary
cultural context for sensationalist murder literature.”202 Evidence abounds that
such notions apply to cases involving women in the criminal justice system. A
brief chronology that highlights the language used by prosecutors, defense
attorneys, medical experts, the accused, the police, prison guards, and

199

Toni Morrison, Introduction to BIRTH OF A NATION’HOOD: GAZE, SCRIPT, AND SPECTACLE IN THE O.J.
SIMPSON CASE xvi–xvii (Toni Morrison & Claudia Brodsky Lacour eds., 1997).
200 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1239 (quoting RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 368
(1991)).
201 See infra notes 202–205 and accompanying text.
202 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 78.
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oversight agents demonstrates how common and pervasive the use of
evocative, allusive language is in this context.
In the early part of the nineteenth century, the prosecutor in the case against
James Eldredge, a man alleged to have poisoned pregnant Sarah Jane Gould
because he had fallen in love with Gould’s sister,203 used a Biblical reference
to persuade the jury of Eldredge’s guilt.204 He introduced the image of the
serpent in the Biblical tale of the Garden of Eden, arguing that the defendant
tempted the woman, and, like that “serpent of old,” brought her to shame and
ruin.205 In another nineteenth-century case, the defense used the same analog,
but this time it was to excuse the conduct of an accused murderer. In the
Richard Robinson case, in which the defendant was alleged to have murdered a
prostitute, it was a woman, not the defendant, who was compared to the
serpent.206 Robinson’s attorney similarly referenced the story of Adam and
Eve in the Garden of Eden.207 He portrayed the prosecution’s chief witness,
the owner of the brothel where the homicide occurred, as “corrupt and rotten,”
“polluted,” and a “tender flower concealing the serpent that is beneath.”208 In
these examples, the lawyers wove allusions and metaphors into their arguments
to create spectacle in the court and promote the adoption of the related
narrative in the public’s consciousness.
During this same period, medical experts adopted the language of nature in
their analyses of aberrant or deviant behavior. The improper use of words,
alleged to be an “abuse of words,” was itself deemed to be madness.209 Nearly
all of woman’s biological ailments were said to originate in her reproductive
organs—“the seat of her diseases.”210 Some physicians believed that
menstruation was itself a form of disease, and others believed that sexual
desire in a woman was a pathological condition.211 The “controlling
203

See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 179.
205 Id. at 179 (quoting THE TRIAL FOR MURDER OF JAMES E. ELDREDGE, supra note 80, at 118) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
206 Id. at 202.
207 Id.
208 Id. (quoting RICHARD P. ROBINSON ET AL., MURDER MOST FOUL!: A SYNOPSIS OF SPEECHES OF OGDEN
HOFFMAN, THOMAS PHENIX, HUGH MAXWELL, JUDGE EDWARDS, & C. ON THE TRIAL OF ROBINSON, FOR THE
MURDER OF ELLEN JEWETT (1836)).
209 CHAPLIN, supra note 64, at 25 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 146 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1986) (1651)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210 CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA
183–84 (1985) (quoting JOHN WILTBANK, INTRODUCTORY LECTURE FOR THE SESSION 1853–54, at 7 (1854)).
211 Id. at 184.
204
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influence” exerted upon a woman by her reproductive processes was believed
to extend to her mental state.212 Hysteria, a “morbid state” in men, was
deemed the “natural state” in women.213 Pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, and
menstruation all placed women in the dangerous state of “temporary insanity”
in which they were “more prone than men to commit any unusual or
outrageous act.”214 Such ideas, dressed in the romantic language of nature and
presented at trials in the form of expert testimony, were used as medical
authority to advance the passionless ideal.215
This reliance on evocative imagery persisted throughout the twentieth
century. Edith Thompson, whose trial for murder in Great Britain has been the
subject of historical commentary and literature since its occurrence in 1922,
subscribed to the narrative scripts of her time. In letters written to her lover
before her husband’s death, Thompson playfully relates stories in the coded
language of the dominant criminal justice discourse. In one, she describes an
encounter with a man looking for a woman who called herself “Romance” with
whom he had corresponded through the “Personal Column.”216 The romantic
images of black lace and roses are notable in Thompson’s letter along with
reference to the possibility that the man in search of “Romance” was “mad.”217
Similarly, the public narrative that followed Thompson’s hanging “partook of
the nature of spectacle”; rumors circulated about her going mad or
miscarrying,218 and social commentators exploited her death to advocate
against either the death penalty or the “flaccid sentimentality” of the anticapital punishment lobby.219
The discourse of spectacle and evocation has become a part of everyday
speech in the criminal justice system—so embedded that it persists even when
the speaker intends to convey the opposite impression. When the court in
Grant v. Dalsheim220 attempted to insist on deliberations free from emotion, it
212

Id. at 183 (quoting WILTBANK, supra note 210, at 7).
Id. at 206 (quoting THOMAS LAYCOCK, AN ESSAY ON HYSTERIA 76 (1840)).
214 RICHARD W. WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 57
(1989) (quoting HORATIO R. STORER & FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, CRIMINAL ABORTION: ITS NATURE, ITS
EVIDENCE, AND ITS LAW 100–01, n.2 (1868)).
215 Id.
216 Letter from Edith Thompson to Frederick Bywaters (Aug. 15, 1922) (excerpted in GRAY, supra note
75, at 20).
217 See id.
218 GRAY, supra note 75, at 22.
219 Id. at 24 (quoting Letter from T.S. Eliot to the Daily Mail (Jan. 8, 1923)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
220 Grant v. Dalsheim, 535 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
213
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ironically used language that was rife with appeals to emotion: “robust,” “ward
off,” and “enraged.”221 More recently, a prison warden related his belief that
“an inmate is an inmate, whether you’re female, whether you’re a male,”222
describing the sameness in language that plays to coded stereotypes:
To me you’re an individual, you just happen to be female. It doesn’t
mean that you are more slick or more sly than the male inmates. I see
the equivalence. An inmate is an inmate. I think some people who
have stereotypes could say, “Female inmates whine a little bit more,
they press to get their way, they keep pushing and pushing and
223
pushing, or they cry.” There are men that are that way.

Similarly, a Human Rights Watch Report, detailing instances of violence
against female inmates uses language that conjures up familiar images, albeit
less conspicuously:
[O]fficers often target like a radar women with histories of sexual or
physical abuse or prisoners in emotionally vulnerable positions such
as those who lack support from family or friends, who are alienated
or isolated by other prisoners or staff and younger women who are
224
incarcerated for the first time.

There is something reminiscent of the depraved heart in the phrase “target like
a radar,” although it arises not from an environment in which the rational man
is the norm and violence is an aberration but rather from an environment in
which violence has come to be accepted in a “culture of impunity.” Perhaps of
equal significance is the fact that alienation, isolation, and vulnerability are
themes of Romanticism and call to mind Romanticism’s narratives of helpless
women in need of protection.
3. Context
Professor Duncan provides examples of skillful judicial authors who
deliberately use the associative power of language to incorporate whole
segments of history through allusion.225 In this way, courts can easily and
unobtrusively renew not only legal precedent but also the assumptions on
221

Id. at 1385.
JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 221.
223 Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
224 Neal v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 285232, 2009 WL 187813, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS (1996), available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Us1.htm).
225 See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
222
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which those legal precedents depend. In two ways, criminal law’s language—
as it describes gendered situations and defines related issues—readily and
demonstrably slips into historical association. Two particular uses of language
can be found in the discourse of “Other” and, conversely, in the discourse of
privilege.
The discourse of “Other,” with embedded linguistic codes, can be seen in
two cases discussed in Professor Duncan’s essay. In McQuirter v. State, a case
raising the question of whether one can be convicted of attempt to commit
assault with intent to rape, the court explicitly condones the jury’s
consideration of “social conditions.”226 This allowed the jury to consider a
police officer’s testimony that the defendant reportedly had come to town on
the night of the alleged crime “with the intention of getting him a white
woman.”227 According to the officer, McQuirter planned to approach the first
white woman he saw, and when one walked by the truck in which he was
sitting, he got out of the truck and “watched the lady.”228 He told the officer
“that he was going to carry her in the cotton patch and if she hollered he was
going to kill her.”229 The reference to the prosecutrix as the “lady” coupled
with a reference to “the cotton patch” plays on deeply entrenched racial myths
and prejudices. Although he denied following the woman, accosting her, or
even making the statements attributed to him, and he had no criminal history,
“[a]ppellant, a Negro man, was found guilty of an attempt to commit an assault
with intent to rape.”230 On appeal, the evidence was found to be “ample to
sustain the judgment of conviction.”231
The previously discussed Boyd case,232 involving the murder of a white
woman by a black man with whom she’d had an affair, provides another
example of the contextually referential discourse of “Other.”233 In Boyd, the
jury heard testimony about gossip and rumors circulated by the victim, saying
that the wife of the accused was a “truck stop girl” and a “hooker.”234 Such
words are part of a broadly inclusive set of condemnations and connote widely
226 McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). For Professor Duncan’s discussion of
McQuirter, see Duncan, supra note 1, at 1221.
227 McQuirter, 63 So. 2d at 389.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 388.
231 Id. at 390.
232 See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
233 Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282 (Del. 1978).
234 Id. at 1284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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accepted judgments about women’s alleged misconduct.
Negative
connotations are inferable from any number of similar euphemisms that may
reference any number of circumstances: sexual transactions, adultery,
promiscuity, loss of virginity, criminality, unwillingness to submit to authority,
poor housekeeping, lack of visible means of support, flamboyance, as well as
many others. Yet all have come to suggest immorality or deviance. Frances
Gray gives a detailed explanation of how, in social history, the phrase “bad
woman” came to mean the same thing as whore, with the terms for slovenly
(“slut” and “slattern”) ultimately becoming synonyms for a prostitute (i.e., a
woman who accepts compensation for the use of her body in a sexual way).235
Gray traces this shift in conceptualization to Shakespeare’s Othello but sees the
phenomenon more broadly as a conflation of roles to prevent women from
having independence.236
The discourse of privilege includes numerous references to feudal times,
where the authority of the state was represented by icons of power to own and
command. This discourse goes back at least to the time of Blackstone, who
saw in the castle a perfect metaphor for man’s dominion over nature.237 That
metaphor has been used for centuries in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Davis
v. State, a 1930 Tennessee case, for example, contains this statement: “It is not
necessary that a defendant’s reason be dethroned to mitigate a killing to
manslaughter.”238 In a more recent narrative, an attorney representing
incarcerated women in a class action suit used feudal imagery to describe the
everyday experience of women guarded by men in District of Columbia
prisons:
At the annex, the women had to run a gauntlet of male prisoners
every day. They would leave the facility and walk down the hill
through a row of men to go eat their meals on the men’s compound.
The men would yell obscenities about the women’s bodies and the
staff would just look away when that happened. This happened every
time they had a meal, and there were three meals a day. It was a
239
highly sexualized environment . . . .

Discussing the situation in Neal v. Department of Corrections, the first case
applying the Michigan Civil Rights Act to prisoners, David Fahti, Director of
235

GRAY, supra note 75, at 72–73.
Id.
237 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
238 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930) (emphasis added).
239 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 256–57 (emphasis added) (relaying an account of attorney and law
professor Brenda Smith).
236
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the United States Human Rights Watch, likened the treatment of women
inmates to torture: “This is a problem that arises whenever you have the power
imbalance and culture of impunity that you see in prisons.”240 By “culture of
impunity,” he meant an environment in which those with authority enjoyed
absolute freedom from punishment, “a culture of prison abuse that was
executed by subordinates and tolerated by administrators.”241 Although it is
ironic that here the castle metaphor is used in reference to violations of the law,
it nevertheless remains true that “culture of impunity” implies a privileged
status.
III. CONCLUSIONS: A DOCUMENTARY COLLAGE
Looking at how the language of criminal law impacts women, one might
question whether its preservation is worth the price. Even a modest critique
exposes drawbacks: the language covers a host of prejudices; it often affirms
the familiar, perpetuating, whether intentionally or not, traditional norms
that—let’s face it—have not improved the lot of most women. This expressive
language often creates a spectacle when respect is called for.
And yet, the feminist critique of language in law certainly has demonstrated
that “steno-language,” dry and imageless, is equally misleading. A strong case
has been made that the language of story and witness helps avoid legal
discourse’s illusion of neutrality and scientific certainty.242 The bottom line is
that when it comes to language, it is never a question of what but rather of how
the language is used, and to what purpose. It behooves us to think seriously
about that purpose: Is it truth or justice? Is it order and peace, or the
preservation of a way of life with all its associated privileges and prejudices?
This final Part uses excerpts of various texts cited in the first two sections
of this Response, such as court opinions, news reports, academic texts
(including Professor Duncan’s essay), true-crime stories, personal narratives,
and testimony to demonstrate how pervasive and compelling the literary
240

Campbell, supra note 179, at 2.
Id.
242 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE
(1995); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 8–9 (1991); George H. Taylor, Derrick
Bell’s Narratives as Parables, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 225, 227 (2007); Leti Volpp,
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 80 (1994);
see also Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial
Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 95 (1992); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2435–36 (1989).
241
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language of the criminal law is. I follow an outline parallel to that employed in
previous sections. The collage thus covers four Parts: (A) Woman as Victim
of Depraved Heart; (B) Seductress Generating Heat of Passion; (C) Wives and
Lovers on the Journey to Salvation; and (D) Women as Prisoners of the Castle.
This documentary collage is intended to break down artificial constructs of
knowledge and provide evidence of the extent to which our assumptions about
crime and women in the criminal justice system are subject to the power of
language, as detailed by Professor Duncan in her essay. It is also an attempt
to demonstrate, through the medium of poetic form, the importance of form
itself and how the mode of expression affects the mode of understanding. The
structure of a court’s opinion takes the mind along one kind of path; a law
review article takes it on another. The structures of poetry, of fiction, and of
literary essay lead the mind along different paths. Each has value.
The particular form used here, documentary poetry, is a relatively new
genre, created from the “everyday debris” of writings that document and adorn
our lives.243 The words “documentary” and “poetry” are derived, respectively,
from root words meaning “to teach” and “to create.”244 Creators of the form
believe that one can find in everyday publications “the sound of a poetry, a
measure-by-placement-&-displacement, not far from our own.”245 The
recasting of existing documentation into literary form is one way to take the
reader along a path that leads to a deeper understanding of the words’ meaning.
“For surely,” says Rothenberg, “it should be clear by now that poetry is less
literature than a process of thought and feeling and the arrangement of that into
affective utterances.”246
We need it all: rhythm, metaphor, allusion, realism, minimalism, lyricism,
mystery, memoir, poetry, romance; the who, what, where, and when of
journalism; and the how and why of academic analysis. Professor Duncan’s
recognition of, respect for, and artful play with the English language deliver
messages worth hearing. Beauty of form is essential; it calls for our attention
and demands our consideration. As physician–poet William Carlos Williams
tells us:
It is difficult
to get the news from poems
243
244
245
246

Introduction to 1 POEMS FOR THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 139.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE LEGAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 546, 1397 (3d ed. 1993).
JEROME ROTHENBERG, PRE-FACES & OTHER WRITINGS 151 (1981).
Id.
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yet men die miserably every day
for lack
of what is found there.247
Seductive Beauty
A Documentary Collage
About Law, Language, and Crime
Prologue
In a noisy Italian restaurant, over low bowls
of steaming eggplant parmigiana,
an old friend startled me one evening
by saying, “I just don’t know how
you can work in that field.”248
It’s the goriness, I suppose,
all the grisly facts—neighbors
attacking each other with a hatchet
and carving knife in a dispute over
a doorstop; a man stabbing his wife
nineteen times after she taunted him
for his passivity; and castaways slaying a boy
to consume his flesh, when adrift
on the high seas.
I expect that is what she meant
by her surprising remark.249
I. Victim of a Depraved Heart
Criminal law is sensual.250
It stirs all the senses,251 it
can make you quiver
with its beautiful language
and concepts.252 Like Attempt.
At first blush, the crime of attempt
247
248
249
250
251
252

WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, ASPHODEL, THAT GREENY FLOWER & OTHER LOVE POEMS 19 (1994).
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1203.
Id.
Id. 1217.
Id.
Id. at 1219. I replaced “criminal law” in the original source with “it.”
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may appear a little dull. . . .
the facts . . . often listless . . .
defendants may be found guilty if
they are in dangerous proximity
to the target crime,
if they have taken the last step
or one substantial step, . . .if
they no longer retain
. . . a place of repentance.253
I have learned to savor
attempt.254 I myself was once the victim
of an attempted crime.255
At a taxi stand,
one of the drivers . . . offered me
a free ride . . .
I should have known better . . . .
He urged that I sit in front
with him,
instead of in back, and I
foolishly
acquiesced.256
[W]e were traveling fast on the highway
and he was talking in a leering tone about my lips . . . .257
he exited the highway and turned on a dirt road. . . .
he stopped the car.
He pulled me toward him
with a rough gesture and started
to kiss me.258
I want women to know that
I was abused by a man . . .
I was used by this man,
I was abused by this man.259
253
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at 1221 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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And we start to talk,
before she took her clothes off, and then
I don’t know. I was driving. I stopped.
I parked my car; I don’t know where. And we moved
to the backseat . . . . She took off her clothes.
I don’t know. I tried to kiss her
or something. Also, she asked me
about money and I told her . . . . I don’t, I don’t pay
money for sex. . . . I tried to make sex with her.
She doesn’t want. Then I don’t know how
she hit me in my eyes and this moment
I feel pain in my eyes. I don’t remember. I,
I hit her and she bite me. . . . I start to hit her,
punch her. I don’t know. . . . I feel scared.
She doesn’t move, she doesn’t talk.
So what I can do.260
The enticements
of the prostitute made him
want to see another
nude female, which led him
to drug, strip, and examine
his young cousin, which
so excited him that he
raped her, which necessitated
killing her, which required
that he kill his mother.261
Whither shall he flee,
and how far,
and when may he be
permitted
to return?262
II. Seductress and the Heat of Passion
There must be a reasonable explanation
259
260
261
262

JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 129 (story of Marilyn).
State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1999) (transcript of a police interview with the defendant).
HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 206.
Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884) (emphasis added).
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for the existence
of the extreme emotional disturbance
or distress.
It is not the person
who must be reasonable at the time
because a reasonable man would not intentionally
kill another person; it is the frenzy of mind
based upon a reasonable explanation
which is basic to the jury’s determination.263
strange thoughts, extraordinary feelings, unseasonable appetites,
criminal impulses,
may haunt a mind
at other times
more innocent
and pure.264
[T]he name heat of passion
is central to the meaning . . . .
Essence, not accident;
a leitmotif . . . .265 beauty is both
objective and subjective—
a quality of the object,
yes,
but also
of the person observing . . . .266
Our need for beauty
springs from the gloom and pain which
we experience from our destructive
impulses . . . ; our wish is to find in art
evidence of the triumph of life
over death.267
those fine looking women268
frail sisterhood . . .
a troop of gaudy poisoners,
teeming with disease269
263

Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Del. 1978).
Edward C. Mann, Morbid Sexual Perversions as Related to Insanity, 14 MED. BULL. 90, 94 (1892).
265 Duncan, supra note 1, at 1206.
266 Id. at 1226.
267 JOHN RICKMAN, On the Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse, in SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 68, 88 (1957).
268 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
264
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array themselves in the most gay costume, adorn their persons
with pearls, rings, paint, and jewels,
and perfume themselves till they smell as sweet as
an oriental garden270
stream through the streets . . . death beneath their skirts.271
bawd, call girl, camp follower, chippie, demi-mondaine, drab,
fallen woman, fancy woman, floozy, grisette,
harlot, hooker, housegirl, kept woman,
lady of pleasure, lady of the evening, lady of the night,
loose woman, madam, slattern, slut, streetwalker, strumpet,
tart,
tramp,
trollop,
trull272
enchant . . . bewitch
young men273
The woman who would
entice the wayfarer
with her blandishments,
and willfully,
and basely

light a fire in his bones . . .
should be treated
as a murderess.

To kill such a woman could be construed,
like the slaying of Medusa,
as an act of just
retribution
and collective
male
selfdefense.274

269 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
270 Id. at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113) (internal quotation marks omitted).
271 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
272 GRAY, supra note 75, at 72 (citing to ROSALIE MAGGIO, THE NON-SEXIST WORD FINDER: A
DICTIONARY OF GENDER-FREE USAGE (1987)).
273 HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 204 (quoting FOOTE, supra note 113) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
274 Id. at 201 (quoting THE LIVES OF JEWETT AND ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 79) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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III. Wives and Lovers on a Saving Journey
“An attempt to commit an assault with intent to rape” . . . means
an attempt to rape which has not proceeded far enough
to amount to assault . . . .275
anywhere between the conception of the intent
and the overt act . . . there is room for repentance; and the law
in its beneficence
extends the hand of forgiveness.276
[T]o justify a conviction . . . the jury must be satisfied . . .
that defendant intended to have sexual intercourse
with prosecutrix against her will, by force
or by putting her in fear.277
(But when she expressed her fears . . . .)278
I pressed charges, they gave him six months, and he went back279
(It was horrible for him, she says, horrible.)280
and that’s when he said he was going to kill me
for sending him back to jail. He281
(became furious at her lack of faith in him
and proceeded with his plan)282
got out in 1986. I hadn’t seen him,
but he’d been looking for me. . . . This one particular night . . .
I was sitting in the car at the supermarket.
Who do I see but him?283 (Almost everything
looks different when seen from up close
than it does from far away . . . .)284
[Appellant] actually discovered the victim
and his wife engaged in sexual intercourse
in appellant’s own home. . . . the passions of any
reasonable person would have been inflamed.285
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284

Burton v. State, 62 So. 394, 396 (Ala. Ct. App. 1913).
State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883).
McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953).
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (parentheses added).
JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda).
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (quotation marks omitted) (parentheses added).
JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda).
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (parentheses added).
JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda).
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1244 (parentheses added).
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‘all this stuff this boy had told me that morning
came back to me and him riding around with his wife
and both of them looked happy and my home
tore all to pieces, I don’t know what happened,
I lost control of myself.’286 (It was horrible for him.)287
[T]he misconduct of the wife
afforded sufficient provocation . . . .288
When he walked up to the car, he had
a grocery bag in his arm, and he shifted the bag.
Then I saw the butt of the gun in there.289
(Anywhere between the conception of the intent
and the overt act . . . there is room for repentance . . . .)290
So, I reached under my seat, and got the gun
and shot out the window, and shot at him. . . .
I was shooting out the window, just scared. . . . I didn’t even know
that I shot him. I knew I grabbed the gun. I knew I fired that gun.
I didn’t think I hit him. I hit him several times, I found out.291
[T]o justify a conviction the jury must be satisfied
that defendant intended. . . (in passion adequately provoked)292
to have sexual intercourse . . . if there is evidence
from which it may be inferred that . . . defendant
intended to gratify his lustful desires . . .
a jury question is presented. . . .
[T]he jury may consider social conditions and customs
founded upon racial differences, such as
that the prosecutrix was a white woman
and defendant was a Negro man.293
(our normal solicitude for the life of the attacker
is somewhat dampened when he chooses such
historically protected premises on which to make his murderous assault.)294
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293

State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tenn. 1987).
Whitsett v. State, 299 S.W.2d 2, 7 (Tenn. 1957) (statement by the defendant).
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1218 (parentheses added).
Thornton, 730 S.W.2d at 314.
JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda).
State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883).
JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 60 (story of DonAlda).
Drye v. State, 184 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tenn. 1944).
McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953).
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[T]he evidence in this case . . . was ample to sustain
the judgment of conviction.295
IV. Prisoners of the Castle
Testify: to make a declaration
Define: to state
of truth or fact.296
the precise meaning of.297
Irony: the use of words to
express something different from
and often opposite to
their literal meaning.298
The term malice aforethought is a false friend,
a misleading cognate,
like the Spanish word embarasada . . .
What does embarasada appear to mean?
. . . Embarrassed. What does it mean?
. . . Pregnant!299
Embarrass: from the French embarrasser, to encumber,
hamper, from Spanish embarazar, from Italian,
imbarazzo, obstacle, obstruction, from imbarrare,
to block, to bar. Meaning:
To cause to feel self-conscious or ill at ease . . . .
To hinder with obstacles or difficulties; impede . . . .
To interfere with (a bodily function)
or impede the function of (a body part) . . . .300
. . . women were shackled in labor;
They were handcuffed
by an arm or a leg or both
while they were giving birth.301
Once an irreligious, unchaste woman

294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301

Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 1980) (parentheses added).
McQuirter, 63 So. 2d at 390.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 1788.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 924.
Duncan, supra note 1, at 1207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 583.
JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 257 (recollections of attorney and law professor Brenda Smith).
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willing to destroy her own child
to conceal her vicious conduct . . .
had been spiritually transformed
during her eight months of bondage,
and had emerged from prison
“Sprinkled, Cleansed, Comforted,
a Candidate of Heaven.”302
Correction: Punishment
intended to rehabilitate
or improve.303
All of them were assaulted, they testified,
by a corrections officer . . . who resigned
after a laundry list of rules violations . . . .
They were also assaulted,
sometimes raped, by other officers
over a period of years, they told the jury.
The women admitted
that most of them did not report
the abuse. There was no point,
they testified. The officer who assaulted
all of them had been investigated
20 times, he told them,
“and they can’t touch me.”304
Assault: from Vulgar
Latin, to jump.305
Rape: from Latin, to seize.306
Abuse: Latin, improper use.307
. . . a former director of the state
Department of Mental Health . . . testified
that the women were believable. He said
they told him of numerous incidents
302
303
304
305
306
307

HALTTUNEN, supra note 65, at 8 (quoting Rogers, supra note 135, at 404, 404)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 411.
Oppat, supra note 175.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 107–08.
Id. at 1450.
Id. at 8.
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that included: Corrections officers
groping some women for years—
three times a day, seven days a week—
. . . A corrections officer regularly
crooking his finger at one woman,
meaning she had to raise her shirt
to display her breasts.
. . . Orders over the public address system
for women to go to deserted areas,
where they would be
sexually assaulted.308
Grope: search blindly309
Crook: dishonest310
Correction: punishment311
“Some states don’t even consider it a crime”
for corrections officers to rape or have sex
with the female inmates whose lives
they control.312 A former
corrections officer testified that . . .
during her first midnight shift
she saw four male officers
go into four inmates’ rooms
and close the doors.313 At the annex
the women had to run a gauntlet
of male prisoners
every day.314
Running the gauntlet. . . .
a form of physical punishment
wherein a man is compelled
to run between two rows—a gauntlet—
308 Andy Angelo, Lawsuit Alleges Women Abused by Prison Guards, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 30,
2008, available at http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/01/lawsuit_alleges_women_abused_b.html.
309 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 774.
310 Id. at 433.
311 Id. at 411.
312 Oppat, supra note 175 (quoting State Assistant Attorney General Allan Soros).
313 Id.
314 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 256 (recollections of attorney and law professor Brenda Smith).
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of soldiers who strike him
as he passes. . . . Running the gauntlet
was considered far less of a dishonor
than a beating (with exposure to ridicule) . . .
since one could “take it like a man”
upright and among soldiers.315
The women
were housed in co-ed facilities . . . .
They would leave the facility
and walk down the hill
through a row of men
to go eat their meals
on the men’s compound. The men
would yell obscenities
about the women’s bodies and
the staff would just look away
when that happened. This happened
every time they had a meal,
and there were three meals
a day. It was a highly sexualized
environment . . . .316
In some traditions, if the condemned
was able to finish the run
and exit the gauntlet, at the far end,
his faults would be deemed paid
and he would rejoin his comrades
with a clean slate. Elsewhere,
he was sent back through the gauntlet
until death.317
They had the power to stop it . . .
Everyone was begging them
. . . to stop the torture.
They took the reports,
315 Running the Gauntlet, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Running_the_gauntlet (last visited June
3, 2010).
316 JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 256–57 (recollections of attorney and law professor Brenda Smith).
317 Running the Gauntlet, supra note 315.
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and did nothing.318
We remain your daughters,
sisters, mothers, aunts, and nieces.
We have been separated,
but we are not gone.
We may be distant,
But we are part of you.
We may be absent,
but we are very much
present.319
apology: An acknowledgement expressing regret or
asking pardon for fault or offense . . . .320
pardon: to release (a person) from
punishment; exempt from penalty . . . .321
regret: . . . from Old French, regreter:
to weep.322
In a gesture
considered extremely rare . . .
the jurors stated:
“We, the members of the jury . . .
would like to express
our extreme regret
and apologies for what
you have been through.”323
Epilogue
We met
in the same Italian restaurant as before,
though it seemed a different place because of
the attractive renovations. The walls, which had
previously shone bright yellow, were now
a stylish pumpkin; the blinding
318
319
320
321
322
323

Oppat, supra note 175 (quoting plaintiff’s attorney Richard A. Soble) (quotation marks omitted).
Joyce Logan, Foreword to JOHNSON, supra note 193, at vii.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 244, at 8.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1470.
Campbell, supra note 179, at 1.
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overhead lighting had been replaced by
the soft glow of Tiffany pendant lamps, and
the tables, which had been crowded together,
were separated now, resulting in
a more peaceful ambience. In addition
to the altered décor, the restaurant boasted
a new menu, so my friend and I—departing
from our traditional eggplant parmigiana—
ordered the apple and goat-cheese ravioli
and lasagna.324

324

Duncan, supra note 1, at 1243–44.
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